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Abstract 
Since its emergence in 1998, positive psychology has flourished. Among its successes is the 
burgeoning field of applied positive psychology (APP), involving interventions to promote 
wellbeing. However, the remit of APP is currently unclear. As such, we offer a conceptual 
map delineating the terrain that APP might conceivably cover, namely, the LIFE (Layered 
Integrated Framework Example) model. The model is based on Wilber’s (1997) Integral 
Framework, which features the four main ontological ‘dimensions’ of the person. We then 
stratify these dimensions to produce a comprehensive conceptual map of the person, and of 
the potential areas of application for APP. For example, we deconstruct the collective 
dimensions of Wilber’s framework using the levels of Bronfenbrenner’s (1977) experimental 
ecology. The result is a detailed multidimensional framework which facilitates a 
comprehensive approach to promoting wellbeing, and which charts a way forward for APP. 
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It is just over 16 years since Martin Seligman used his 1998 APA presidential address to 
inaugurate the new field of positive psychology (PP) (Fowler, Seligman, & Koocher, 1999). 
Since then, PP has flourished, drawing in graduate recruits and established scholars, and 
attracting funding and interest from diverse sources within academia and beyond (Rusk & 
Waters, 2013). One of the most successful aspects of PP is the emergent discipline of applied 
positive psychology (APP), which can be defined as the science and practice of improving 
wellbeing. At the heart of APP is a growing corpus of positive psychology interventions 
(PPIs) designed to promote wellbeing in practical ways, as elucidated throughout this article. 
APP has proved to be a very fruitful branch of PP, as reflected in the number of postgraduate 
courses devoted to APP. However, in spite of, or rather because of, the rapid emergence of 
APP, the development and accumulation of PPIs has accelerated ahead of any systematic 
theoretical conceptualisation of the field (Parks & Biswas-Diener, 2014). As such, the present 
article offers one such conceptualisation, in the form of a model which we have labelled the 
LIFE (Layered Integrated Framework Example) model. The article is in three parts. In the 
first section, we examine the nature and remit of APP, and consider what constitutes a PPI. In 
the second section, we outline the need for a multidimensional approach to wellbeing. In the 
third section, we articulate the LIFE model itself, and use it to organise the field of APP, thus 
providing a comprehensive strategy for enhancing wellbeing. 
Applied positive psychology and positive psychology interventions 
Turning first to the nature and remit of APP, the spirit of APP is one of praxis. In the 
Nichomachean Ethics, Aristotle (350 BCE) constructed a tripartite classification of human 
activities: poiēsis (productive/creative disciplines); theōria (contemplative endeavours); and 
praxis (practical occupations involving the skilful application of ideas). In more recent times, 
an eloquent articulation of praxis was formulated by Karl Marx (1845, p.158), who suggested 
that ‘The philosophers have only interpreted the world, in various ways. The point, however, 
is to change it.’ The concept of praxis has been influential in the social sciences, where it is 
defined as ‘practical action informed by theory’ (Foster, 1986, p.96). In the case of APP, this 
‘practical action’ is specifically in the direction of improving wellbeing. This spirit of praxis 
has seen PP being applied in various practical domains, from positive education (Seligman, 
Ernst, Gillham, Reivich, & Linkins, 2009) to positive clinical psychology (Wood & Tarrier, 
2010). In formulating our LIFE model, we offer a way of conceptualising the diverse ways in 
which APP can promote wellbeing across different areas of life.   
Before we introduce this model, it is worth asking what APP does in these applied 
domains. PPIs constitute the core of APP; however, there is on-going debate around the 
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necessary and sufficient criteria for recognising interventions as PPIs. Parks and Biswas-
Diener (2014) identify and critique three broad conceptualisations of PPIs. Content-level 
definitions define PPIs as interventions that focus on ‘positive topics.’ A weakness here is 
that this encompasses any pleasant activity, with no requirement that any positive outcome 
(after the event) be generated. Variable level definitions identify PPIs as interventions that 
work upon a positive mechanism (e.g., broaden-and-build; Fredrickson, 2001) or produce a 
positive outcome (e.g., positive cognitions). While this definition is more selective, at issue is 
that the concept of a ‘positive’ outcome is often vaguely operationalized. A third type of 
definition identifies PPIs as practices designed to promote wellness, rather than fix 
dysfunction and alleviate distress. However, this definition overlooks recent developments 
around using PPIs for the treatment of mental disorders, e.g., positive psychotherapy for 
depression (Seligman, Rashid, & Parks, 2006). Moreover, all these definitions struggle to 
accommodate recent theorising in PP around the inadequacy of simplistic binary polarisations 
of ‘positive’ and ‘negative.’ For example, ostensibly positive emotions/qualities can have 
adverse outcomes; e.g., optimism is implicated in under-appreciation of risk (Peterson & 
Vaidya, 2003). Conversely, negative emotions may ultimately serve wellbeing; e.g., anxiety 
can alert us to potential threats (Seligman & Csikszentmihalyi, 2000). Going further, Lazarus 
(2003) queries the very possibility of even assigning a singular valence to emotions; for 
example, hope is co-valenced, comprising both the wish for a desired outcome, and fear that 
it will not happen. Moreover, from a wider psychosocial perspective, the significance and 
desirability of emotions cannot be judged without taking context into account; for example, 
forgiveness can be maladaptive in the context of an on-going abusive relationship (McNulty, 
2011). More philosophically, the relationship between positive and negative is inherently 
dialectical; these are binary terms that are by definition conceptually co-dependent (Ryff & 
Singer, 2003). Thus, Resnick, Warmoth, and Serlin (2001) caution against polarising 
psychology into ‘good’ and ‘bad,’ but urge us to appreciate the complexities of the good life. 
This more nuanced approach to wellbeing has been labelled ‘positive psychology 2.0’ 
(Wong, 2011).  
Given these conceptual debates around the term ‘positive,’ it can be difficult to state 
with certainty what constitutes a PPI. Moreover, it may not be possible to categorise a 
particular intervention as being exclusively a PPI. For example, since Kabat-Zinn (1982) 
operationalized the concept of mindfulness, it has been applied in diverse settings: in being 
used to treat physical illness, like chronic pain, it could be regarded as a medical intervention 
(Kabat-Zinn, 1982); in being adapted for the treatment of mental illness, like depression, it 
Running head: A CONCEPTUAL MAP FOR APPLIED POSITIVE PSYCHOLOGY  
6 
 
might be deemed a clinical psychology intervention (Teasdale et al., 2000). However, 
mindfulness has also been extensively used in non-clinical settings, not for alleviating 
distress per se, but for promoting general wellbeing (Smith, Compton, & West, 1995). This 
last example might offer us one potential way of identifying PPIs: PPIs may be defined not so 
much by the practices themselves as by the population they are applied to; we could thus 
broadly define PPIs as empirically-validated interventions designed to promote wellbeing in a 
non-clinical population. For example, one-to-one PPIs might be viewed as ‘therapy for 
people who don’t want therapy.’ It is important to state that this would not stop PPIs still 
being used to address mental health issues, as with positive psychotherapy (Seligman et al., 
2006). The salient point here is how one conceptualises such issues, and classifies those 
people deemed to be suffering from them. The question of when dysphorias become 
recognised and treated as clinical disorders is much debated (Flett, Vredenburg, & Krames, 
1997). Nevertheless, one can identify situations in which a person is judged to be 
experiencing a mental health problem, but this is not regarded as a clinical disorder, either by 
clinicians or by the person themselves. For instance, a person may ascribe their distress to a 
‘legitimate’ sense of existential anomie, rather than view it as a psychopathology. In such 
cases, some people may have previously undertaken psychotherapy; others may now choose 
to engage with a psychologist who could provide a relevant PPI. Furthermore, this general 
definition of PPIs (interventions to promote wellbeing in a non-clinical population) would not 
prevent PP informing treatment in clinical settings; for example, activities typically regarded 
as PPIs (e.g., gratitude journals; Emmons & McCullough, 2003) may be used in clinical 
psychology as adjunctive treatments alongside more conventional therapies (Wood & Tarrier, 
2010). Nevertheless, this general definition does offer a potential heuristic for ascertaining 
what constitutes a PPI. Having considered what PPIs are, the LIFE model below can help us 
identify the areas of application in which PPIs might be used. However, before articulating 
this model, we discuss the value of, and need for, a multidimensional approach to wellbeing. 
Multidimensional approaches to wellbeing 
The proposed LIFE model involves a multidimensional conceptualisation of the person, and 
therefore offers a multidimensional approach to wellbeing. Such approaches to health and 
wellbeing are increasingly common. An early pioneering example is the World Health 
Organization’s (1948) definition of health as ‘a state of complete physical, mental and social 
well-being, and not merely the absence of disease and infirmity.’ This recognises three main 
dimensions to the person, and their health/wellbeing: physical, mental, and social. The same 
dimensions are also evident in Engel’s (1977) biopsychosocial model of health. More closely 
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related to PP, Jahoda’s (1958) ‘positive mental health’ construct featured a biopsychosocial 
approach to wellbeing. However, our LIFE model is based on a newer multidimensional 
conceptualisation of the person, the Integral Framework, developed by the American 
philosopher Ken Wilber (1997). We shall first outline Wilber’s framework, and its relevance 
to PP, before explaining below how we have adapted it through a process of stratification to 
create our own LIFE model. Wilber’s framework is described as an ontological ‘map’ 
elucidating ‘the basic dimensions of an individual’ (Esbjörn-Hargens, 2010, p.73). The 
particular innovation of Wilber’s framework is that it identifies four dimensions, rather than 
the three dimensions of the WHO, Engel, and Jahoda models. These dimensions are produced 
by juxtaposing two common binaries, creating a logically appealing framework.  
The first binary is the mind-body dichotomy. The relationship between subjective 
‘mind’ and objective ‘body’ has perplexed thinkers throughout the ages, and was famously 
described by Chalmers (2004) as the ‘hard problem’ of philosophy. Various perspectives 
have developed over the centuries: materialistic monism treats the physical body as the 
primary (or even only) reality, with subjectivity treated reductively as an illusion or 
epiphenomenon; conversely, transcendental monism (or idealism) views substance as a 
mental construct (e.g., a figment of mind); finally, dualistic perspectives acknowledge the 
reality of both body and mind, with various theories taking different positions on the nature 
of their interaction. Dualism underlies the dominant paradigm in contemporary consciousness 
studies, the neural correlates of consciousness (NCC) approach, which proposes that states of 
mind are accompanied by analogous neurophysical states (Fell, 2004). Currently the 
paradigm aims only to chart the neurophysiological correlates of mental states – our 
understanding is not sufficiently advanced to ascertain directional causality, or solve 
Chalmers’ (2004) ‘hard problem’ (i.e., how brain activity might generate consciousness). 
Nevertheless, the NCC approach acknowledges both subjective mind and objective 
body/brain. This ‘mind-body’ distinction, then, is one of the two binaries that create the 
Integral Framework. The second binary is the individual-collective dichotomy. This reflects 
the idea that there are two fundamental ‘modes of existence’ – ‘agency’ and ‘communion’ 
(Bakan, 1966). Agency refers to the way people exist as discrete, autonomous individuals, 
whereas communion reflects the idea that people are also inextricably embedded in socio-
cultural networks that sustain their being, physically and/or mentally. The study of these 
modes of being has tended to be somewhat compartmentalised in academia, with psychology 
focusing on agency for example, and communion addressed by fields like sociology. 
However, theorists have begun to acknowledge the limitations of studying these modes in 
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isolation, and the need to explore their complex interactions. Thus, the term ‘psychosocial’ 
has become increasingly prominent in academia (Martikainen, Bartley, & Lahelma, 2002). 
Consequently, the individual-collective distinction constitutes the second dichotomy that 
forms the Integral Framework.  
          SUBJECTIVE                       OBJECTIVE 
 
 
 
INDIVIDUAL 
 
 
 
 
 
COLLECTIVE 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1: Schematic diagram of the four quadrants, adapted from Wilber (1997) 
 
Wilber’s (1997) innovation was to juxtapose these two binaries, creating a two-by-
two matrix of four quadrants, shown in Figure 1. Beginning with the top left of the schematic, 
the subjective-individual quadrant is the domain of the mind, an umbrella term encompassing 
general subjective experience, including conscious thoughts, feelings and sensations (as well 
as unconscious subjective dynamics). The objective-individual quadrant is the domain of the 
body/brain, i.e., physiological functioning and behaviour. The subjective-collective quadrant 
is the domain of relationships, and the common hermeneutic worldspace these generate, 
including shared meanings and values; we can refer to this ‘intersubjective’ domain as 
‘culture’ (as in ‘the culture’ of a group of people). Finally, the objective-collective quadrant is 
the domain of structural social networks, like the material manifestations of communities 
(such as transport or housing infrastructure), or more intangible processes such as economic 
systems; we can refer to this ‘interobjective’ domain as ‘society.’ Wilber’s framework 
represents a powerful tool for conceptualising wellbeing in an integrated way. For example, 
Hanlon, Carlisle, Reilly, Lyon, and Hannah (2010, p.307) have deployed it in public health to 
understand the ‘maze of interconnected problems’ which affect wellbeing. Their article 
presents a hypothetical case-study, which is comparable to the following example. A person 
SUBJECTIVE 
 
Individual conscious 
experience 
 
MIND 
OBJECTIVE 
 
Correlated physical 
substrates 
 
BRAIN 
CULTURE 
 
Relationships and 
shared meanings 
 
INTERSUBJECTIVE 
SOCIETY 
 
Material systems 
And structures 
 
INTEROBJECTIVE 
Running head: A CONCEPTUAL MAP FOR APPLIED POSITIVE PSYCHOLOGY  
9 
 
is depressed due to unemployment. Considered from the individual-subjective perspective, 
their suffering can be appraised in terms of distress, understood using cognitive theories of 
mental illness, and addressed through therapy. From the individual-objective perspective, 
their suffering can be conceptualised in terms of brain dysfunction, understood with 
neurochemical theories, and treated through medication. From the subjective-collective 
perspective, their suffering can be apprehended in terms of cultural meanings around 
unemployment, understood through social constructionist theories, and tackled by 
challenging societal norms. Finally, from the objective-collective perspective, their suffering 
can be considered in terms of socio-economic factors that both contribute to and result from 
unemployment, understood through economic and political theories, and addressed through 
efforts towards a fairer society. Hanlon et al. argue that all these ‘key dimensions of human 
experience need to be considered, harmonized and acted on as a whole’ to fully address the 
wellbeing of the person (p.311).  
Before setting out our own adaptation of Wilber’s framework in the form of the LIFE 
model, we can see how his framework constitutes a powerful device for organising constructs 
within PP. Its power resides partly in the fact that it is ‘content free:’ rather than advocating 
theories in a given area, extant theories and research from that area can be situated within the 
quadrants. First, within the subjective domain, we can situate the abundance of constructs 
directly pertaining to mental health and illness. Here, wellbeing can be conceptualised 
positively as the presence of desired outcomes, like hedonic pleasure, or negatively as the 
absence of mental disorder and distress. Desirable outcomes include the triumvirate of 
elements comprising the well-lived life according to Seligman (2002): the pleasurable life 
(constructs like SWB); the engaged life (notions like flow; Csikszentmihalyi, 1990); and the 
meaningful life (as reflected in Ryff’s (1989) model of PWB). (Situating these constructs 
here does not mean they are unconnected to the other domains. Ryff’s model encompasses 
relationships, for instance, which pertains to the intersubjective domain. Indeed, the point of 
an integrated framework such as Wilber’s is that the domains are interlinked.) This domain 
also includes the array of desirable psychological qualities explored by PP, such as resilience 
(Masten, 2001). Additionally, as argued above, the remit of PP not only covers these 
ostensibly ‘positive’ constructs, but extends to ‘negative’ phenomena like sadness (Wong, 
2011), which can also be located here. As the most ‘psychological’ domain, this is the root 
quadrant; the others are only relevant to PP to the extent that they impinge on this domain 
(e.g., affect SWB). Nevertheless, examining the other domains enables us to appreciate the 
multitude of factors which can influence wellbeing.  
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The objective domain concerns the physiological functioning and behaviour of the 
body and the brain. First, this quadrant encompasses everything relating to physical health, 
and so overlaps with Seligman’s (2008) concept of ‘positive health.’ Larson (1999) has 
identified numerous models of health, including: the WHO model (noted above); the medical 
model, which defines health as the ‘absence of disease and disability’ (p.124); the wellness 
model, concerned with ‘progress towards higher levels of functioning’ (p.129); and the 
environmental model, pertaining to successful adaptation to one’s milieu. These models can 
all be situated here, as can the diverse health behaviours which impact upon physical 
wellbeing, like exercise (Hefferon & Mutrie, 2012). It is worth emphasising that some models 
and concepts may not ‘fit’ precisely within one quadrant, but intersect or overlap more than 
one quadrant. For instance, the ‘wellness model’ of health pertains to connections between 
physiological functioning and subjective states. Indeed, as noted above, a central point about 
Wilber’s framework is that the quadrants are not hermetically sealed, but interact and 
reciprocally influence each other. As such, a key element of research located in this quadrant 
is the exploration of connections between bodily and subjective states. For example, 
embracing the NCC paradigm (Fell, 2004), a ‘positive neuroscience’ research program has 
begun exploring the ‘neural correlates of wellbeing’ (Urry et al., 2004), such as trait 
asymmetric activation of the pre-frontal cortex (Davidson, 2000).  
The intersubjective domain covers relationships, and the shared ‘culture’ (e.g., values) 
that these generate. A key construct pertaining to this domain is social capital, defined by 
Bourdieu (1986, p. 248) as the ‘sum total of the resources, actual or virtual, that accrue to an 
individual (or a group) by virtue of being enmeshed in a durable network of more or less 
institutionalized relationships of mutual acquaintance and recognition.’ Social capital is a 
complex and elastic construct, encompassing all types of relationship of relevance to PP. 
These range from bonds within the home, addressed by specialities like positive relationship 
science (Fincham & Beach, 2010), to relations at school or at work, explored by positive 
education (Seligman et al., 2009) and positive organizational scholarship (Cameron, Dutton, 
& Quinn, 2003). This domain captures the manifold ways in which relationships are central 
to wellbeing, from engendering positive emotions (e.g., love) to being sources of social 
support (Umberson & Montez, 2010). It also encompasses the emergent forms of ‘culture’ 
generated by relationships. This includes the way cultural systems can generate values and 
worldviews that are generally considered conducive to wellbeing, like religion (Koenig, 
2009), or detrimental, like materialism (Van Boven, 2005). (An intriguing question here is 
whether Wilber’s (1997) Integral Framework, and our LIFE model, are themselves culturally 
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specific worldviews, as we explore in an endnote 
i
.) This domain also includes cultural norms 
– e.g. in relation to gender (Lomas, 2013) – that influence behaviour and so affect wellbeing. 
Lastly, the interobjective domain refers to structural aspects of society: impersonal 
processes, institutions and environments which ‘scaffold’ people’s lives. These structures 
range from the material conditions of the surrounding environment to macro-economic forces 
that influence employment. This domain thus encompasses the work of theorists across 
different fields exploring how such structures impact upon wellbeing, from economics to 
international development to politics. In economics, SWB has been used as an alternative to 
Gross Domestic Product (GDP) as an index of societal progress, and consequently scholars 
have assessed the impact of factors like income on SWB (Layard, 2005). From an 
international development perspective, relevant structural factors include indices used by the 
UN (2013) to calculate their ‘human development index,’ i.e., living standards, health 
outcomes, and education provision. Political factors influencing wellbeing include the quality 
of governance, as assessed by the World Bank for instance (Kaufmann, Kraay, & Zoido-
Lobatón, 1999). Further potential factors include the quality of the environment (e.g., air 
pollution), from a local community level (Burke, O'Campo, Salmon, & Walker, 2009) to a 
wider national and even global level (New Economics Foundation, 2013).  
The LIFE Model 
Having introduced Wilber’s (1997) Integral Framework, we can now examine the way we 
have adapted this to produce our own Layered Integrated Framework Example (LIFE) model, 
represented graphically in Figure 2 below. Essentially, this model introduces further nuance 
to our understanding of wellbeing by viewing each domain as being layered or stratified, 
delineating different strands within them. There are many possible ways of ‘carving up’ the 
domains, and the approach adopted in the LIFE model is by no means the only viable option; 
indeed, Wilber himself identifies different strata within his own model (focusing primarily on 
the emergence of particular qualities in human evolution). This is the reason our own 
adaptation is called the ‘Layered Integrated Life Example’ – our model is just one example of 
how such layering might be done, and of a multidimensional model generally. Our approach 
is to view each domain as comprising various ‘levels,’ where each level encompasses or 
supersedes the level ‘below’ it. This stratification approach will become clear as we consider 
the domains in turn, and outline how we have delineated various levels within. In keeping 
with the focus of this paper on applied PP, we identify relevant interventions for each level. 
In many instances, we draw on existing PPIs; in that sense, the model simply clarifies the  
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Figure 2: The Layered Integrated Framework Example (LIFE) model 
 
field as it stands. At times though, the model helps us identify potential PPIs that could be 
developed in future, thus pointing the way ahead for APP. 
 Starting with the subjective domain, four different phenomenological ‘strata’ are 
readily identifiable: embodied sensations, emotions, cognitions, and conscious awareness. 
More contentiously, one could regard these strata as proceeding from ‘lower’ to ‘higher’ in 
some respects, with each level superseding the one before. This claim rests on two premises. 
First, phylogenetically, these strata arguably emerged in this sequence: embodied sensations 
would have preceded discursive cognitions in our evolutionary progression (MacLean, 1990). 
Second, and similarly, this sequence arguably also applies to ontogeny: infants are thought to 
develop sensory capacities before they acquire emotions, and complex thoughts later still 
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(Piaget, 1971). To these layers we have added a more contentious fifth stratum, labelled 
tentatively as ‘awareness+.’ This level reflects the work of theorists who propose that 
conscious awareness can be superseded by further advanced developmental capacities 
(Josipovic, 2010). Such capacities include ‘non-dual awareness,’ the experiential dissipation 
of the dualistic ‘subject-object construct,’ which is regarded as an advanced stage of 
consciousness associated with spiritual experience and development (Wilber, 1997).  
 From an APP perspective, we can examine PPIs that ‘work on’ the various subjective 
levels. This means psychological techniques for enhancing wellbeing (i.e., the kind one could 
do sitting alone at home), in contrast to PPIs involving actions/behaviour (situated in the 
objective quadrant), relationships (in the intersubjective quadrant), or structural features of 
the environment (in the interobjective quadrant). Proceeding through the strata, we can 
identify PPIs pertaining to each of the levels, thus providing a comprehensive arsenal of 
strategies aimed at the subjective domain. However, we must emphasise that these levels are 
not rigidly separated, and most PPIs touch upon more than one level. For example, PPIs 
targeted at emotions include interventions to enhance emotional intelligence (EI; Mayer & 
Salovey, 1997); while evidently pertaining to emotions, EI also involves emotional awareness 
(i.e., consciousness) and ratiocination (i.e., cognitions). Thus, describing PPIs as targeting a 
particular level is simply a heuristic device, and we must strive to remain cognizant of the 
complex interrelationships between the levels. Nevertheless, in terms of appreciating the 
range of PPIs available, differentiating these according to the levels is a useful strategy.  
 Taking first embodiment, PP has begun to explore the relationship between embodied 
subjectivity and wellbeing, for example in relation to post-traumatic growth (PTG) (Hefferon, 
Grealy, & Mutrie, 2010). Such work has helped address Seligman’s (2008) call, in his paper 
on ‘positive health,’ for PP to become more than a ‘neck-up’ focused discipline. From an 
APP perspective, practices like ‘body-mind’ therapy work with embodiment in promoting 
wellbeing (Barratt, 2009). Moving ‘up’ levels, the importance of positive emotions to PP can 
hardly be overstated, these being almost the defining feature of the field. However, in terms 
of identifying emotion-focused PPIs, this does not simply mean PPIs that promote positive 
emotions as an outcome, as arguably most PPIs are ultimately geared towards making people 
feel better in some way (e.g., engendering SWB). Rather, emotion-focused PPIs are those that 
develop people’s ability to work with their emotions, i.e., emotional management skills. 
There are PPIs designed to cultivate particular attitudinal qualities, such as loving-kindness 
meditation to promote compassion (Fredrickson, Cohn, Coffey, Pek, & Finkel, 2008), or 
Japanese Naikan therapy to engender gratitude (Chan, 2010). More comprehensive emotion-
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focused interventions also exist. For instance, Mayer and Salovey’s (1997) hierarchical 
model of EI comprises four branches: emotional awareness, generation, understanding, and 
management. Accordingly, PPIs have been developed which target all four branches (e.g., 
Crombie, Lombard, & Noakes, 2011). Moving up to the cognitive level, appreciation of the 
relevance of discursive thoughts to wellbeing has generated cognitively-focused PPIs. Some 
involve recalling and describing positive events in discursive prose, including activities based 
around journaling (e.g., the gratitude journal; Emmons & McCullough, 2003) and writing 
about positive memories (Burton & King, 2004). Other interventions include narrative 
restructuring exercises, where people reflect on ostensibly negative experiences and develop 
meaningful narratives around these. For example, Garland, Carlson, Cook, Lansdell, and 
Speca (2007) created a six-week intervention for cancer sufferers: through journaling and 
creative arts (e.g., writing, drawing), participants engaged in narrative self-exploration, which 
fostered PTG. Located here too are innovative therapies using PP in the context of the 
treatment of mental health issues, such as wellbeing therapy (Fava & Ruini, 2013).  
Stepping up to the level of conscious awareness, the exemplar PPI in this regard is 
mindfulness. Following Kabat-Zinn’s (1982) pioneering mindfulness-based stress reduction 
(MBSR) programme, interest in mindfulness has exploded, with over 500 studies in 2012 
alone (Shonin, Van Gordon, & Griffiths, 2013). The MBSR protocol has led to a proliferation 
of adaptations, ranging from mindfulness-based cognitive therapy, designed to prevent 
depressive relapse (Teasdale et al., 2000), to novel treatments such as smoking cessation 
(‘surfing the urge’; Bowen & Marlatt, 2009). Finally, we might note that meditation is also 
associated with the kind of advanced developmental skills and states of consciousness that we 
are tentatively referring to here as ‘awareness+’ (Wilber, 1997). Awareness+ also serves as a 
helpful overarching term for practices that might otherwise be referred to as ‘spiritual.’ 
Spirituality is a contested concept. Some conceptualisations explicitly bind it to numinous 
experiences; the Encyclopaedia of Religion and Society defines it as the ‘quality of an 
individual whose inner life is oriented toward God, the supernatural, or the sacred’ (Yamane, 
1998, p.492). Less contentiously perhaps (from a metaphysical perspective),‘intrinsic origin’ 
definitions depict spirituality simply as an ‘inner search for meaning and fulfilment’ (Graber, 
2001, p.40). Inclusion of spirituality in the LIFE model is in keeping with Wilber’s (1997) 
Integral Theory; Wilber himself was influenced by spiritual philosophers, particularly the 
Integral Yoga of Sri Aurobindo (2005 (1939-1940)). Thus, under the rubric of awareness+ we 
can locate the various practices people worldwide have created to help them access a sense of 
spirituality. Most cultures have developed spiritual practices, usually in the context of 
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specific religious traditions. For instance, in Sufi Islam, ‘Sama’ involves ‘reverently listening 
to music and/or the singing of mystical poetry’ (Lewisohn, 1997, p.3). In future, PP could 
draw on such practices in creating new PPIs. An example in this respect is Mardiyono, 
Songwathana, and Petpichetchian (2011), who discuss using Islamic ‘relaxation techniques,’ 
incorporating prayer and recitation of the Qur’an, in the context of nursing practice. 
Turning to the body/brain domain, hierarchical stratification of levels here is perhaps 
easier to envisage: biochemical molecules and atoms (e.g., sodium ions) form neurons; 
neurons combine in neural networks; such networks are part of the larger nervous system; 
and the nervous system is one aspect of the whole body. (Reinforcing the point about our 
stratification being just one ‘example,’ one could easily identify other viable hierarchies, 
perhaps featuring more gradations or highlighting other elements.) In terms of APP, we can 
examine the influence of each level on wellbeing, and moreover, design interventions to act 
on that level. For example, at the biochemical level, mental illness can be conceptualised in 
terms of the activity of neurotransmitters like serotonin; interventions here aim to alter 
biochemical ‘imbalances,’ as with selective serotonin reuptake inhibitor (SSRI) treatments 
(Ferguson, 2001). Such interventions are presently limited to medical disciplines like 
psychiatry, used in the treatment of psychopathology. However, research has pointed to the 
potential positive impact on wellbeing of psychoactive drugs such as MDMA (Adamson & 
Metzner, 1988). It is conceivable that clinicians will in future harness such substances to pro-
actively promote wellbeing; for example, Sessa (2007, p.220) argues that psychiatrists could 
explore ‘MDMA-assisted psychotherapy’ as an adjunct to more conventional treatments. 
 Moving up levels, we can explore the impact of neural networks on wellbeing. These 
networks refer to the way mental activities are produced by the interaction of distributed 
brain areas, assessed by paradigms such as electroencephalography (EEG). As per the NCC 
approach, EEG analysis connects wellbeing to patterns of neural activity, such as greater left-
sided hemispheric activation (Davidson, 2000). Moreover, from an APP perspective, such 
patterns can be promoted by interventions like neurofeedback; for instance, Gruzelier, Foks, 
Steffert, Chen, and Ros (2013) used neurofeedback with children to enhance music creativity 
and general wellbeing. Neurofeedback activities can be situated within a larger framework of 
biofeedback, which targets the nervous system more generally. For example, Kleen and 
Reitsma (2011) developed a promising intervention that combined Heart Rate Variability 
(HRV) biofeedback training (reduced HRV is associated with outcomes like anxiety) with 
mindfulness. In terms of the body as a whole, scholars have begun to explore the complex 
intersections between physical health/illness and SWB and PWB (Hefferon, 2013). From an 
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APP perspective, PPIs focusing on the body include exercise (Hefferon & Mutrie, 2012) and 
dance therapy (Puig, Lee, Goodwin, & Sherrard, 2006). 
 Finally, we turn to the collective domains of the LIFE model – the intersubjective and 
interobjective realms. Incorporating these domains into PP can help address one of the most 
prominent criticisms levelled against the field, namely that it pays insufficient attention to the 
social dimensions of wellbeing. Critical theorists such as Becker and Marecek (2008) argue 
that conceptualisations of wellbeing in PP reflect a culturally-specific version of the good 
life, building upon a North American tradition of expressive individualism, where happiness 
is framed as a private concern, achieved through self-determined choices. Although social 
institutions are one of Peterson’s (2006) ‘three pillars’ of personal fulfilment, there has been 
little analysis within PP of structural factors that might affect a person’s ability to flourish, 
like educational and economic opportunities (Prilleltensky & Prilleltensky, 2005). As such, 
learning from such critics, PP can develop a more comprehensive approach to wellbeing by 
taking the collective domains into account. In the LIFE model, we have stratified these 
domains using Bronfenbrenner’s (1977) influential experimental ecology, which identifies 
various socio-cultural ‘levels’ ranging in scale from micro to macro. This model can be used 
for both collective domains, as it straddles the two quadrants: one can analyse all levels from 
either an intersubjective (e.g., shared values) or an interobjective perspective (e.g., structural 
aspects of that level). However, we have omitted the first level of Bronfenbrenner’s model – 
the individual person themselves (e.g., their cognitive processes) – from these collective 
domains, since in our LIFE model, Bronfenbrenner’s first level has been massively expanded, 
constituting in effect the entire subjective and objective domains. Thus, in terms of the 
intersubjective and interobjective domains, we begin the stratification at the second tier of 
Bronfenbrenner’s model, the ‘microsystem.’ We shall consider these levels in turn, 
highlighting examples of PPIs that pertain to each level. 
The micro-system is the immediate social setting of the person, e.g., their family or 
workplace. To reinforce the point about Bronfenbrenner’s model straddling both collective 
domains, we can approach these settings from an intersubjective (e.g., a family’s shared 
values) and/or an interobjective perspective (e.g., their material circumstances). When PP has 
taken social dimensions into account, it has usually been limited to this level. In PP, the 
importance of the micro-system is recognised in studies highlighting the powerful association 
between relationships and wellbeing; indeed, according to Helliwell and Putnam’s (2004) 
analysis of the World Values Survey, close relationships such as marriage are the most 
important contextual determinant of wellbeing. More broadly, a wealth of studies attest to the 
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importance to wellbeing of friendship and good relationships with others generally 
(Umberson & Montez, 2010). From an APP perspective, one approach to the micro-system 
involves enhancing the quality of relationships. We have already touched upon some relevant 
PPIs above; for example, practices to promote pro-social emotions, like loving-kindness 
meditation, can enhance relational connectedness (Fredrickson et al., 2008). (The fact that 
many PPIs have positive outcomes across multiple domains serves to reinforce the point that 
the four domains – of both the LIFE model and Wilber’s Integral Framework – intersect and 
reciprocally influence each other. Moreover, multiple-domain outcomes are also indicative of 
the potency of a PPI, i.e., its ability to positively impact upon manifold aspects of a person’s 
life.) There are also more comprehensive PPIs aimed at enhancing relationships. Kauffman 
and Silberman (2009) highlight the use of PP in couple’s therapy. For instance, they suggest 
that ‘growth-fostering relationships’ can be engendered by teaching people effective 
communication strategies, like responding positively to good news, e.g., so-called ‘active-
constructive responding’ (Gable, Reis, Impett, & Asher, 2004). Such PPIs aimed at 
enhancing relationships are transferable to other micro-systems: active-constructive 
communication is promoted in positive organizational scholarship as an effective leadership 
strategy, for example (Avolio, Bass, & Jung, 1999). Alternatively, from an interobjective 
perspective, APP might involve improving the material environment of the micro-setting, 
e.g., enhancing its aesthetics. Gesler’s (1992) work on therapeutic landscapes has emphasised 
the twin beneficial effects of pleasing environments: rewarding to appreciate and create. For 
example, natural light and greenery are conducive to emotional wellbeing, which is why 
gardens are often incorporated into healthcare settings (Marcus & Barnes, 1999). Moreover, 
creating such environments in itself constitutes a PPI: gardening is a therapeutic activity, a 
potent combination of ‘achievement, satisfaction, and aesthetic pleasure’ (Milligan, Gatrell, 
& Bingley, 2004, p.1781), and also social bonding if done collectively. 
Next, the broader network of the meso-system refers to the interaction between 
micro-systems. This level recognises that people ‘exist in inter-locking contexts’ which 
together affect functioning (Sheridan, Warnes, Cowan, Schemm, & Clarke, 2004, p.7). 
Indeed, Prilleltensky, Nelson, and Peirson (2001, p.151) argue that ‘clinical and community 
interventions are inseparable.’ Unfortunately though, Prilleltensky et al. suggest the meso-
system perspective is often overlooked in psychology: ‘we typically psychologize children’s 
problems and ignore the social and political context in which their problems occur’ (p.157). 
However, researchers are beginning to appreciate the importance of taking a meso-system 
approach to wellbeing and general psychological development. Meso-level PPIs involve 
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working with clients across diverse settings. For example, Sheridan et al. argue that, for 
children, their two primary micro-systems are home and school, which have a ‘bidirectional, 
reciprocal influence over each other’ (p.11). As such, Sheridan et al. have formulated a child-
focused meso-system intervention – ‘family-centred positive psychology’ (FCPP) – which 
establishes partnerships between families and schools through a process of ‘conjoint 
behavioural consultation.’ Parents and teachers, together with an FCPP ‘consultant,’ engage 
in a structured problem-solving process, spanning home and school, to address the ‘academic, 
social, or behavioural needs’ of a child who is troubled in some way (p.10). Another 
successful meso-system intervention is the ‘Families and Schools Together’ (FAST) 
programme (McDonald et al., 1997), a multifamily school-centred intervention, designed to 
build protective factors for children (e.g., enhancing bonds with parents), which has been 
endorsed by Save the Children in the UK and the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime.  
Scaling up still further, the ‘exo-system’ refers to structures that ‘encompass the 
immediate settings,’ such as the wider community in which micro-systems are situated 
(Bronfenbrenner, 1977, p.515). Community factors have a significant impact upon wellbeing. 
Burke et al. (2009) identified 120 factors, aggregated into six main categories, which were a 
blend of interobjective and intersubjective elements: necessary human and social services; 
neighbourhood support (i.e., social capital); green areas and natural environment; social 
make-up of people (e.g., age-diversity); neighbourhood affordability; and an absence of 
negative community factors (e.g., noise). From an APP perspective, any action to enhance 
any of these factors could be deemed a PPI, since this would have the effect of improving the 
neighbourhood, thereby enhancing the wellbeing of people within it. This could be done in a 
top down way, i.e., local authorities designing neighbourhoods according to wellbeing 
principles. For example, open communal spaces where people can interact serve to enhance 
the collective wellbeing of a community, particularly if these incorporate greenery, as per the 
concept of therapeutic landscapes (Chiesura, 2004). Improvements can also be enacted in a 
‘bottom-up’ way by communities themselves. For instance, Mongkolnchaiarunya (2005) 
outlines a community-based waste management initiative in Thailand. This not only 
addressed the interobjective factor of waste disposal, it engendered intersubjective benefits 
like ‘community empowerment through self-reliance’ (p.27). Less functionally, but still 
powerfully, community arts initivatives – such as decorating public spaces – not only 
improve the aesthetics of the neighourhood, but promote social capital and individual 
wellbeing (Dunphy, 2009). More comprehensive interventions have also been attempted. For 
example, in the UK, the Well London project was devised to improve health behaviours 
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among marginalised communities in deprived areas of the city (Wall et al., 2009). This was a 
non-prescriptive collaborative project, working with local communities to identify and meet 
their needs; as such, the particular projects used with each community varied. Among the 
successful projects were ‘Healthy Spaces’ (improving public spaces to encourage physical 
activity) and ‘Be Creative Be Well’ (communal creative arts to promote social capital).  
The most expansive of Bronfenbrenner’s (1977, p.515) levels is the macro-system – 
‘overarching institutional patterns… such as the economic, social, educational, legal, and 
political systems’ of which the other levels are ‘concrete manifestations.’ Exemplar macro-
level analyses include the World Bank’s assessment of the ‘quality of governance’ 
worldwide, examining over 200 countries across six dimensions (Kaufmann et al., 1999): 
voice and accountability; stability; effectiveness; regulatory framework; rule of law; and 
control of corruption. These dimensions can impact upon wellbeing; e.g., there is a negative 
correlation between civil rights violations and country-level SWB (Diener, Diener, & Diener, 
1995). As summarised by Duncan (2010, p.165), the happiest communities are not 
necessarily the wealthiest, but those who enjoy ‘effective social and political institutions.’ In 
terms of APP, interventions at a macro level involve shaping public policy according to 
wellbeing considerations (Evans, 2011). Indeed, recent UN-commissioned analyses of global 
happiness levels have led to just these kinds of wellbeing-focused structural 
recommendations (Helliwell, Layard, & Sachs, 2013). The pioneering example of wellbeing 
as a policy driver is Bhutan, which in 1972 replaced GDP as their gauge of societal progress 
with Gross National Happiness (GNH) (Braun, 2009). Crucially, from an APP perspective, 
GNH is not simply measured, but is used by the government to inform policy decisions, with 
all proposed policies systematically evaluated according to GNH considerations.  
Although Bhutan is ahead of other nations in this regard, the idea of policy being 
informed by wellbeing considerations has been gathering strength for some years in other 
countries. For example, in the UK, Huppert and Baylis (2004) argued that policies could be 
enacted to help counter stereotypes and attitudes that were detrimental to people’s wellbeing, 
such as making occupational age-related discrimination illegal. Such arguments were heeded, 
as the Age Discrimination Act was enacted into law in the UK in 2006. Moreover, recent 
years have seen more systematic top-down efforts to consider the policy implications of 
wellbeing. In the UK, the Office for National Statistics (ONS) began in 2011 to include SWB 
items within its annual Integrated Household Survey, disseminated to 200,000 people, thus 
generating a National Well-being index (ONS, 2011). Moreover, the Prime Minister David 
Cameron announced in 2010 that this index would help guide governmental decisions, and 
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consequently established an internal policy unit – the Behavioural Insights Team, often 
referred to as the ‘nudge unit’ – geared towards this end (Bache & Reardon, 2013). This unit 
has helped develop policies based on Thaler and Sunstein’s (2003) concept of ‘libertarian 
paternalism.’ These policies are designed to encourage people to make healthy choices, 
crucially though, without coercion, but by arranging the ‘choice architecture’ in ways that 
makes the ‘right’ (i.e., healthy) choice more likely (e.g., by making it the default option). 
Other macro-system PP initiatives pertain to economic factors. For example, Haque (2011) 
has called for a ‘positive economic paradigm’ that is not only concerned with profit 
maximisation, but with fulfilling ‘human potential.’ 
Finally, we have taken the liberty of ‘adding’ another level to Bronfenbrenner’s 
original model, namely the global ecosystem. The biosphere encompasses all the other 
systems, being the physical matrix that supports their very existence. This level matters to PP 
because, in an existential sense, human wellbeing is ultimately dependent upon planetary 
wellbeing (Smith, Case, Smith, Harwell, & Summers, 2013): concerns about flourishing are 
fundamentally subservient to the survival of humankind, since one must be alive in order to 
flourish. This recognition is reflected in attempts to take ecological variables into account, 
like societal sustainability, when calculating macro-levels of wellbeing (New Economics 
Foundation, 2013). Moreover, this level falls within the purview of APP since environmental 
wellbeing depends to an extent on human behaviour. As such, we can devise PPIs that might 
impact positively on the environment, intervening at any of the levels of Bronfenbrenner’s 
model to encourage more sustainable behaviours. At a micro-system level, sustainable energy 
consumption can be promoted through smart meters that provide households with feedback 
about their energy expenditure (Fischer, 2008). From a meso-system perspective, energy 
consumption used commuting between micro-systems might be reduced, perhaps through 
interventions to encourage ‘active commuting,’ like walking/cycling (Yang, Sahlqvist, 
McMinn, Griffin, & Ogilvie, 2010). Exo-system PPIs could include efforts to promote 
recycling: in intersubjective terms, this may involve attempting to make it a cultural norm or 
a valued pro-social behaviour (Hopper & Nielsen, 1991); in interobjective terms, this means 
enhancing the provision of recycling services (Read, 1999). At a macro-system level, PP 
could play a role in advocating for regulatory solutions, such as national and international 
commitments to environmental sustainability (Spash, 2010), by advancing a wellbeing policy 
agenda. 
Conclusion 
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The LIFE model presented here offers a comprehensive multidimensional approach to 
wellbeing. It identifies different dimensions of relevance to PP, including subjective mind, 
objective body/brain, intersubjective culture and interobjective society. Moreover, it stratifies 
these domains into various levels, introducing further nuance and complexity into the model. 
The LIFE model represents the potential terrain for APP, which we define here as the science 
and practice of improving wellbeing; we can intervene across all these dimensions, targeting 
all of their levels, to actively promote wellbeing. As emphasised throughout, our LIFE model 
is but one possible multidimensional model, and one way of stratifying these dimensions. As 
such, the model is not intended as a final word on the kind of multidimensional framework 
that can drive PP forward. Rather, this paper is just the beginning of a broader conversation in 
PP about the value of, and need for, a multidimensional approach to wellbeing.  
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i
 The issue of whether Wilber’s (1997) Integral Framework is itself a culturally specific worldview is 
somewhat complex. Wilber’s epistemological position might arguably be described as critical realist. 
While critical realism recognises that truth and objectivity are problematic, it disavows radical 
relativism, and holds that it is ‘unwise and premature to abandon wholesale, claims to objectivity and 
the search for ‘truth’” (Layder, 1998, p.3). Wilber (1995) acknowledges that all viewpoints (including 
theories such as his own) are inextricably perspectival and culturally situated; there is no 
Archimedean ‘view from nowhere’ (Nagel, 1989). However, at the same time, Wilber holds that some 
viewpoints are more accurate than others, and even if we cannot achieve absolute objectivity, we can 
make progress towards it; here he cites Thomas Kuhn (1970, p.206), who, despite formulating the 
powerful concept of shifting scientific paradigms, remained a ‘convinced believer in scientific 
progress’. As such, Wilber (1995) contends that his framework does accurately capture the four basic 
ontological dimensions of the person. At the same time, he allows that this framework could yet be 
superseded by still more accurate conceptualisations; for example, while in a relative sense the 
distinction between objective body and subjective mind may be valid, people in future may eventually 
deem this distinction to be ultimately illusory, as some spiritual teachings suggest (e.g., Sri 
Aurobindo, 2005 (1939-1940)). The authors take a similar critical realist position with respect to the 
domains of the LIFE model, which are regarded as provisionally accurate and valid. The issue is 
slightly different with regard to the layering of the LIFE model. As set out in the section on layering, 
the identification here of five specific layers is somewhat arbitrary; one could easily stratify the 
domains in any number of ways, choosing a greater or lesser number of layers, or deciding to focus on 
different specific layers, depending on one’s agenda and priorities. 
